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Excellent overview of contemporary and historic tactics
Excellent Overview of Naval Strategy
The tactical guide to naval combat

Introduction to Ignatian Spirituality
Must be read!
This book is what America is searching for.

Excellent BookThe book is very well written, and very informative. It gives a very mature insight into the HK-1 project, as well as Howard Hughes himself.
I highly recommend this book to anybody wanting a detailed account of the events pertaining to Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat.
BARTON CAPTURES THE GENIUS OF HOWARD HUGHES & SPRUCE GOOSE
More Than The Story Of A Big Wooden Plane

Excellent Book
Nothing short of excellent!In this wonderful book, Dr. Graham Hughes of St. Thomas' Hospital, London (and the man for whom this syndrome is named) gives the lay-reader and doctor alike a clear and concise understanding of what this syndrome is, what its effects are, and what treatments are currently available. Though quite short (63 pages), it is jam-packed with easy-to-read information, which is well organized, and complete with some excellent illustrations and many case studies. The case studies go a long way towards giving the reader a clear idea of what having Hughes Syndrome means to those suffering from it.
My wife and I are very glad we got this book. It is truly nothing short of excellent. Plus (as previously pointed out), its price is quite modest compared to the other Hughes Syndrome books currently available. If you or anyone you knows has been diagnosed as having Hughes Syndrome, then I highly recommend that you purchase this book!
Excellent Book!In an easy to read style, Dr. Hughes describes this auto-immune disease completely. This is a great book for both patients and their families. I recommend this highly.


What kind of review?
A Philosophy of Spiritual Activity
Ever wondered how you KNOW anything?

fun and comprehensive book for a great innovative game
Valuable Resource for Beginners and Experienced Players
I liked it!

Appreciating the sculptures and paintings of MichelangeloThe strength of the Famous Artists series remains its emphasis on allowing young readers to experiment with the techniques of particular artists through the use of hands-on projects (e.g., proportion, composition, carving in relief) as well as by providing preliminary sketches and materials to show the artistic process at work. Each two-page spread features an illustration of the artist's home or environment, the continuing story of the Michelangelo's life, details and examples of the his work at that particular time, and a feature on the artist's technique with practical projects to try. Often there are enlargements of key parts of the work and there is always a symbol indicating the size of the work relative to a human being. As a general rule, these are excellent books for providing readers, young and old alike, with a basic art appreciation introduction to the world's greatest artists.
great value, great textBuonaratti after reading this. He truly was a miserable man, yet his committment to his art was never diminished for a moment. In the end the story of his life is inspiring and humbling. Inspiring because it proves what man can acheive, humbling in the sacrifices that were made in order to fulfill his destiny as one of the great geniuses to have ever lived.
Great Layout, Great Content

Strategy and TacticsMoltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.
According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.
Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and 'central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that 'interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III intended to implement a similar maneuver to cut Prussia off from south Germany. First, he hoped to defeat Prussia, alone, which would entice Austria and Italy into forming a triumvirate with him. Then he hoped the triumvirate would attack the south German Confederation.
During the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia was victorious in battle, but as Moltke says, 'at what a cost'. It seems to me that Prussia's losses were rather high, primarily because of their reluctance to change plans and to break off any engagement once it began. Then the 'peoples army' arose like a phoenix in the midst of the vanquished French field armies, which made the consummation of Moltke's final victory elusive. He could not pursue all the remaining military targets; therefore, he just focused on one-Paris. He surrounded the French capital with the preponderance of his remaining forces (150,000) because it was the only strategic option left open to him.
The commander should position himself with his uncommitted reserves to ensure that they are committed where and when they may be of greatest service; he should not be at the front with units already committed. He should send reserves to those areas where the forward units are already nearly winning, thereby, overcoming these areas of resistance faster, with fewer losses by their timely intervention. Secondly, he should endeavor to bolster tenuous positions or those that are in danger of being lost.
The attack has the advantage of dictating the course of events to the defender who must conform to them. The advantages are greater morale and confidence gained through the knowledge of the time and place of the attack. The best method of attack is to envelope the opponent with two forces. First, one must attack the opponent frontally with one force to pin down as much of their main force as possible. Then the second force must attack the opponent's flank. Moltke believed that both the frontal and flank attacks should be performed simultaneously, however, if I were attacking the flank, I would wait until it has been sufficiently denuded, since the opponent will be drawing forces from it to counter the frontal attack (i.e., feint). The flank attack is usually the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt), but the frontal attack may be the center of gravity as well. There should be a reserve element to cover the force attacking the opponent's flank. An example of precisely this method took place during the battle of Koniginhof (Austria, 1866).
This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. Many of these methods are just as valid today as they were in 1860. Moltke writes very lucidly with great candor, which is precisely what one would expect of a Prussian Officer.
Moltke vs ClausewitzMoltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial envelopment. This worked well in 1866 against the Austrians and in 1870 against the French. His system seemed to promise victory in any war. He had taken the gift of fire from Prometheus and changed its very nature, or so his followers thought. Moltke himself grew more cautious in his later years, suggesting that only a partial success could be achieved in a war against both France and Russia, a political solution would have to be found for the strategic dilemma instead. During the period up to and following the First World War, most German military thinkers followed Moltke's earlier views while giving lip service to Clausewitz. Moltke was the more modern man, the technician of war for the machine age, while Clausewitz was a philosopher, belonging to another time and mode of thinking, or so it seemed.
Professor Hughes' book provides translations of various examples of Moltke's writings. I found Moltke's views on the training and duties of General Staff officers particularly interesting. The editor includes excellent commentary on various German military terms and the ways that they have been translated into English in the past, some rather confusing.
In all I find this book well worth the money and would recommend it to those interested in German military history, 19th Century military history, and military strategy and tactics in general, particularly the evolution of military thought. What seems to be missing is an edition of the works of Sigismund von Schlichting, who as Hughes points out provides the key link between Moltke's theories and modern theory.
Relevent to business, war, and current affairs

great book
I am so bummed that this is out of printThis book is very enjoyable to read as well as being full of great, and accurate, information.
wonderful to read and botanically accurate

A wealth of info for the Ferrari junkie
Wonderful Book !
Wonderful book !
This is the spectrum "Fleet Tactics" seeks to analyze. It does this remarkabley well. It also explores more intangible factors. Moral and leadership are terms often used but rarely integrated into a coherant strategy towards victory. It seems taken for granted, but the author shows how we must take nothing for granted when restructuring our tactical phillospohy. Re-examining age old ideas and historic battles is only one side of the coin. Here, we have a book that does this but holds up such notions for the purpose of building better tactical thinking.
I have read both the original edition and this newe, updated one... the changes are clear. We have a book that picks up where naval theory as of 1990 left off. While still managing to represent its original content with value towards the tactician in naval warfare.
Read this book is you are interested in more than just bland analyses of age old battles. Read it if you want to develope a strong understanding of how naval conflicts of almost every kind should be fought. Read it if you want to develope a sound understanding of the timeless tactical cornerstones in naval strategy.